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Assessing Corporate Sustainability
Through Ratings:
Challenges and Their Causes
Sarah Elena Windolph
Leuphana University Lüneburg
windolph@uni.leuphana.de

ABSTRACT: Assessing corporate sustainability is increasingly practice-relevant, not least because
the capital market and other markets have been paying growing attention to the topic. Recently,
ratings have become an important assessment approach and nowadays a variety of organizations
and financial service providers conduct their own ratings. Yet, despite their growing popularity,
ratings are criticized in research and practice. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to systematize the
challenges that corporate sustainability ratings face: lack of standardization, lack of credibility
of information, bias, tradeoffs, lack of transparency, and lack of independence. Furthermore,
the paper discusses the causes of these challenges and suggests possible ways to improve the
reliability of ratings.

integrate them into the economic management
KEYWORDS
corporate sustainability assessment, corporate of a company (Dunphy, Griffiths, and Benn;
sustainability measurement, ratings, socially Shrivastava and Hart). Increasingly, the demand
for CS is not only driven by societal or political
responsible investment (SRI)
expectations, i.e. push factors, but also by the
potential for internal organizational improvements
I.
INTRODUCTION
(e. g., cost reduction), as well as the demand of
Sustainability is a topic of growing significance consumers and investors, i.e. pull factors (Dyllick,
for companies just like the contribution of Belz, and Schneidewind; Meffert and Kirchgeorg;
companies is becoming essential for sustainable Schaltegger and Wagner). Examples of this latter
development (Dunphy, Griffiths, and Benn; market pull are the rising demand for organic food
Dyllick and Hockerts; Epstein; Schaltegger (Wier and Calverley) and the growing significance
and Burritt). Corporate sustainability (CS) is of socially responsible investment (SRI) (Beloe,
understood here as an approach to systematically Scherer, and Knoepfel; Moskowitz; Sparkes
consider environmental and social issues and to and Cowton).
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This increasing market demand entails the need
for CS assessment and evaluation. But, since the
corresponding information on individual companies
is rarely publicly available, there is a substantial
risk that sustainability-oriented companies are
not recognized. Additionally, as sustainability
commitments are hard to verify, less responsible
companies may make use of this by greenwashing,
that means intentionally providing incomplete or
even false information (Darbi and Karny; Laufer;
Ramus and Montiel). If consumers and investors
are willing to make their purchase and investment
decisions based on CS but only have information
which is incomplete or which they do not trust,
sustainability-oriented companies may in the worst
case be crowded out of the market, although they
actually offer what customers are looking for.
This phenomenon is known as market for lemons
(Akerlof): responsible companies cannot be
identified; therefore consumers and investors are not
willing to pay for their products or to invest in those
companies. Consequently, those companies do not
survive in the market. In order to prevent such a market
for lemons, reliable information intermediaries with
more resources to gather information and carry out
an external CS assessment become important, for
example consumer associations, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and journalists (Chatterji
and Toffel; Healy and Palepu; Lee and Cho;
Rischkowsky and Döring).
Recently, ratings have become especially
important for CS assessment (Chatterji and Toffel;
Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and Fernandes), not least
because of the increasing interest of the capital
market where ratings are an established tool to
estimate the credit worthiness of, for example,
companies (econsense; Finch; Healy and Palepu;
Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and Fernandes). Assessing
and benchmarking CS through ratings among
other things serves to improve accountability and
enables cross-company comparison (Graafland,
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Eijffinger, and Smid). However, despite (or perhaps
because of) their increasing relevance, CS ratings
are subject to a lot of criticism, especially regarding
their transparency (e. g., Delmas and DoctoriBlass; Dillenburg, Greene, and Erekson; Fowler and
Hope; Sadowski, Whitaker, and Buckingham, Rate
the Raters. Phase One), their independence (e. g.,
Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel; Epstein; Graafland,
Eijffinger, and Smid), and their variety (e. g.,
Chatterji and Levine; Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel;
Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and Fernandes).
The fact that ratings try to fulfill a challenging
task is revealed by the lack of standardization
and best practice methods. Important reasons for
this are the missing definition and the subsequent
diverse perception of CS (Linnenluecke, Russell,
and Griffiths; Schaltegger and Burritt; Seelos;
van Marrewijk). This room for interpretation
has not only led to a range of CS practices (e. g.,
philanthropic sponsoring activities or core business
relevant sustainability management), but also to
heterogeneity of assessment approaches – not only
of ratings and SRI research but of CS assessment
approaches in general (Delmas and Doctori-Blass;
Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and Fernandes). Table 1 offers
an overview of CS assessments and lists examples.
The variety of assessment approaches that
consumers, investors, and further stakeholders
are increasingly confronted with poses a problem
in its own right. This not only holds true for the
assessment of companies but also for products. The
organic food sector, for instance, has generated a
“confusing multitude” of certificates and labels
(Wier and Calverley 54). Therefore, it is difficult
for consumers to decide which labels to trust and
how to compare competing labels (Jahn, Schramm,
and Spiller; Wier and Calverley). Accordingly,
stakeholders are still unable to judge whether
products and companies are really oriented towards
sustainability, and thus, depend on the assessment of
intermediaries (Rischkowsky and Döring).
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CS assessment approach

Examples

SRI research
(‘in-house’)

Sarasin’s Corporate Sustainability Rating (Bank Sarasin & Co Ltd.)
ZKB Sustainability Research (ZKB)

Ratings

MSCI (formerly KLD) Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Ratings
(MSCI Inc.)
oekom’s Corporate Responsibility Rating (oekom research, oekom Corporate
Rating)

Indices

Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSI) (SAM’s Corporate Sustainability
Assessment and Dow Jones Indexes; SAM; SAM Indexes GmbH; SAM and
PwC)
FTSE4Good (EIRIS’ sustainability research and Financial Times Stock
Exchange Group, EIRIS)
Ethibel Sustainability Indices (ESI) (Vigeo’s sustainability research and
Standard and Poor’s, Vigeo and Forum Ethibel)

Rankings
Awards

Good Company Ranking (Balzer et al.)
Global 100 Most Sustainable Companies in the World (Corporate Knights
Inc.)
German Sustainability Award (Stiftung Deutscher Nachhaltigkeitspreis e.V.)

Assessments by NGOs, Guide to Greener Electronics (Greenpeace)
consultants, and
Carbon Disclosure Project (Carbon Disclosure Project)
research organizations

Table 1: Prevalent approaches to externally assess CS.
Against this background, the research question of
this paper is what challenges CS ratings face and
what their causes are. The paper is structured as
follows. Firstly, after a short introduction to the
relevance of ratings, it displays and systematizes
the challenges for CS ratings based on a literature
review. Several ratings are included for illustration
purposes. Secondly, the paper determines the causes
of these challenges by reviewing more general
literature on CS and CS assessment. Thereupon,
the paper identifies ways to improve the reliability
of CS ratings.

II.

BACKGROUND: RELEVANCE
OF RATINGS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE

This section elaborates on the relevance of external CS
assessment from a theoretical perspective, and then
highlights the practical importance of ratings in particular.
II.I

RELEVANCE OF RATINGS
FROM A THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVE
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An important difficulty when assessing CS externally
lies in information asymmetries (Lyon and Maxwell;
Rischkowsky and Döring). Consumers, investors,
and other stakeholders are not able to verify the
sustainability claims made by companies, because
they do not have access to the relevant information
(Ramus and Montiel). This not only affects
products (Jahn, Schramm, and Spiller) but also
processes inside companies and along supply chains
(Chatterji and Levine; Epstein). Reliable third party
institutions with resources to gather the needed
information become important players (Healy and
Palepu; Lee and Cho; Rischkowsky and Döring).
Ratings or rating organizations are one example of
such information intermediaries.
Another important aspect is that CS is
socially desired (de Boer; Epstein). Ongoing
discussions in the media as well as the increasing
meaning of sustainability-oriented products, for
example in the financial market, illustrate that
society and markets are increasingly concerned with
the topic (Hansen, Große-Dunker, and Reichwald;
Meffert and Kirchgeorg; Sparkes and Cowton; Wier
and Calverley). This fact may not only motivate
companies to get involved with sustainability
issues and to communicate about them, but also to
exclusively communicate positive and leave out
negative information. In an extreme case, companies
may even perceive an incentive to pass on false
information in order to improve their reputation or
market share (Darby and Karni; Laufer, Rischkowsky
and Döring). The risk of such opportunistic behavior,
known as greenwashing, is increased by the lack of
a definition of CS and the large scope of different
interpretations (van Marrewijk).
The outcome of such a situation may be a
“market for (organic) lemons”: stakeholders cannot
identify sustainability-oriented companies (hidden
characteristics) because of a lack of information or
of trust in the offered information. This leads to a
diminished willingness to pay for the companies’
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products or a lower readiness to invest. Ultimately,
sustainability-oriented companies may be crowded
out of the market (adverse selection) (Akerlof;
Rischkowsky and Döring). This market failure
probably causes negative effects on the environment
and society when sustainability-oriented companies
are replaced by exclusively economically-oriented
ones. Accordingly, the contribution of companies
to sustainable development of the economy and
society will diminish even more.
Both Economics of Information (e. g.,
Shapiro; Stigler; Stiglitz) as well as the principalagent theory (Jensen and Meckling) (and related
approaches like the stakeholder-agency theory,
see Hill and Jones) deal with ways to overcome
asymmetric information or adverse selection in
markets. They offer two basic approaches to this
problem. The first approach is signaling (Spence).
Signaling in this context means that companies
emit credible signals indicating their sustainability
orientation. Examples are the publication of
sustainability
reports
offering
stakeholders
information on sustainability efforts, and the
establishment and use of brands or labels transporting
and substantiating sustainability related messages
about products or companies (de Boer; Finch; Kolk).
However, these signals only fulfill their function if
the addressees perceive them as reliable (Müller;
Rischkowsky and Döring). Yet, reliability is not
always given due to the “climate of general distrust
towards social organizations” (Renn and Levine 212)
and the risk of opportunistic behavior. Therefore,
signaling may be insufficient in the context of CS.
An alternative approach to overcome
information asymmetries is screening, which
here means that consumers, investors, or other
stakeholders actively search for and evaluate
information on the sustainability performance of
companies (Rischkowsky and Döring; see also
Stiglitz). Compared to earlier times, the Internet
allows for much more transparency and information
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access today (Rezabakhsh, Bornemann, Hansen,
and Schrader; Seelos). Yet, consumers and investors
cannot access all relevant data as a matter of
resource constraints (time and data access). Hence,
information intermediaries come into play (Healy
and Palepu; Lee and Cho; Rischkowsky and Döring).
Ratings are an important example of this kind of
external assessment, although screening for CS is
complicated by the diverse perception of the concept.
Yet, although several challenges have to be met in order
to reliably assess CS by screening, it still appears more
promising than signaling which makes opportunistic
behavior easier (Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid).
Furthermore, screening simplifies the comparison of
companies which could be relevant to consumers and
investors. Therefore, this paper focuses on ratings as
a practice-relevant application of screening.
Nonetheless, when differentiating between
signaling and screening it has to be kept in mind
that one approach cannot be seen separate from the
other. On the one hand, the assessment made through
screening can be used to substantiate companies’
signaling approaches, which might be perceived
as more reliable than information without external
verification (Rischkowsky and Döring). Audits, labels,
and certificates also follow this procedure. On the other
hand, in order to carry out their assessment, ratings at
least partially depend on the disclosure of information
by companies, and thus, on suitable internal metrics
(Chatterji and Levine). For these reasons, CS signaling
and screening are interdependent. Intermediaries
carry out the screening process for stakeholders and
substantiate companies’ signals.
II.II PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF CS
RATINGS
CS ratings have become increasingly practicerelevant (Chatterji and Toffel; Schäfer, Beer,
Zenker, and Fernandes). Whereas conventional,
finance-related ratings are used to estimate the

credit worthiness of companies (Healy and
Palepu), CS ratings serve to systematically and
regularly analyze the environmental, social,
and economic performance of companies, and,
furthermore, allow the comparison of companies
(Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel; Finch; Graafland,
Eijffinger, and Smid; Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and
Fernandes). Sustainability ratings are carried
out by a variety of organizations, for example
specialist rating agencies, analyst departments in
banks, operators of (securities) indices, classic
credit rating agencies, and few NGOs (Delmas
and Doctori-Blass; Finch; Schäfer, Beer, Zenker,
and Fernandes) (see Table 1). Most CS ratings
have been launched within the last ten to fifteen
years, mainly because institutional investors are
increasingly interested in sustainability-related
or socially responsible investments (Moskowitz;
SAM and PwC; Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and
Fernandes). Today, an independent market for
the services of CS intermediaries has developed,
and it is expected to grow due to the rising social
awareness of environmental and social issues and
related market demands. For example, the number
of assessed companies for Sustainable Asset
Management’s (SAM) Corporate Sustainability
Assessment increased from 468 in 1999 to 1,237 in
2009 (SAM and PwC).
Among the variety of CS assessment
approaches ratings play a special role, since
they not only constitute an assessment approach
themselves but also form the basis for further
benchmarking approaches like rankings and indices
(for more details on ratings see Schäfer, Beer,
Zenker, and Fernandes; for the methodologies of
major sustainability indices see Fowler and Hope).
Therefore, the procedures that ratings apply have
consequences for subsequent approaches.
Despite the visible efforts to assess CS,
related approaches and particularly ratings are
criticized in both research and practice (Beloe,
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Scherer, and Knoepfel; Chatterji and Levine; Chatterji,
Levine, and Toffel; Delmas and Doctori-Blass;
Dillenburg, Greene, and Erekson; Fowler and Hope,
Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid; Hansen; Sadowski,
Whitaker, and Buckingham, Rate the Raters. Phase
One; Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and Fernandes). Hence,
Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel (29) conclude that many
research organizations “will have to fundamentally
review many aspects of their research methodology
and approach,” and Sadowski, Whitaker, Lee, and
Ayars (5) conclude that “the market will settle on
a few “winners”.” The challenges that come along
with CS ratings will be discussed in the following.
Several practice-relevant ratings are drawn upon for
illustration purposes.
III.

CHALLENGES FOR CS
RATINGS AND THEIR CAUSES

CS ratings are dealt with in research and practice.
Although a certain amount of literature deals with

the challenges for CS ratings, they have not been
systematized so far. In section 3.1 six important
aspects will be identified and elaborated:
lack of standardization, lack of credibility of
information, bias, tradeoffs, lack of transparency,
and lack of independence. The synthesis builds
on a review of academic literature as well as
practice-relevant publications on ratings,
indices, and related assessments of CS and
identifies those aspects that are discussed in
several publications. Table 2 offers an overview
of the challenges and their meaning. Building
on this, section 3.2 identifies the causes of the
challenges and discusses them on the basis of
more general CS literature.
III.I CHALLENGES FOR CS RATINGS
III.I.I. LACK OF STANDARDIZATION
Although CS ratings have spread, little
standardization has been achieved. This is the result

Rating challenges
Lack of standardization

Meaning
Diversity of approaches and results, no evaluation of approaches, no
comparability (Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel; Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel;
Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid)

Lack of transparency

Rarely full disclosure of methodology, criteria, threshold values, etc.
(Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel; Delmas and Doctori-Blass; Dillenburg,
Greene, and Erekson; Fowler and Hope)

Bias

Emphasis on economic, environmental, or social dimension; focus on
investors’ needs; focus on larger companies (Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel;
Chatterji and Toffel; Fowler and Hope)

Tradeoffs

Aim at single score, possible compensation of unsatisfactory partial results
(Delmas and Doctori-Blass; Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid)

Lack of credibility of
information

Companies can influence rating results, missing information verification
(Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel; Fowler and Hope; Healy and Palepu)

Lack of independence

Relation between rating organizations and companies (AI CSRR; Beloe,
Scherer, and Knoepfel; Healy and Palepu)

Table 2: Challenges for ratings assessing CS.

42

Journal of Environmental Sustainability – Volume 1

of the varying interests and perceptions that raters
and stakeholders have in terms of CS. Beyond that,
even those ratings that actually do address the same
issues and interests apply varying measures and use
their own methodology (Sadowski, Whitaker, Lee,
and Ayars). The competing approaches have rarely
been evaluated in academic research so far, although
this is regarded as crucial for the construction of
ratings (Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel; Sharfman)
and indices (Fowler and Hope). Exceptions are for
example works by Chatterji and Levine; Chatterji,
Levine, and Toffel; Chatterji and Toffel; Knoepfel;
and Sharfman.
Furthermore, whereas the assessed
companies may aim at standardization where
possible (econsense), this is not desirable from
the stakeholders’ point of view because of their
different perception of and interest in CS (Beloe,
Scherer, and Knoepfel; Dillenburg, Greene, and
Erekson; Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid). Hence,
standardization of ratings and the establishment of
best practices are unlikely for the time being.
Another cause for the lack of rating standardization
is company-internal CS accounting and reporting
(Schaltegger). Ratings use publicly available
information as well as data disclosed by companies.
Yet, the ways that companies gather and communicate
information are typically very different. Especially
the measurement of social issues as well as the
evaluation of the influence of CS on companies’
success is difficult and not organized systematically.
Therefore, the data that ratings build upon is not
necessarily comparable and quality might differ.
This fact can distort the rating result.
III.I.II. LACK OF CREDIBILITY OF
INFORMATION
In order to assess CS, ratings depend on suitable
information. As already discussed earlier, there
is a significant lack of data availability. Thus,

besides publicly available data (like company or
media reports), raters at least partially depend on
self-disclosure of companies. A lot of companies
acknowledge the signaling function of ratings
and take part in surveys (Dillenburg, Greene, and
Erekson; Fowler and Hope; Schäfer, Beer, Zenker,
and Fernandes), for example through investor
relations departments which communicate with
analysts and investors (Healy and Palepu). For
instance, inclusion in the DJSI requires companies
to “fill in a detailed questionnaire covering a wide
range of weighted economic, environmental, and
social factors” (Fowler and Hope).
Yet, the credibility of company information
may be questioned, “[b]ecause managers have
incentives to make self-serving voluntary disclosures”
that will not negatively affect their competitive position
(Healy and Palepu 425; see also Laufer). That is one
reason why many rating organizations use additional
publicly available information to verify data (Beloe,
Scherer, and Knoepfel). For example, EIRIS refers
to the information of “government and regulatory
agencies, industry organizations, trade publications,
campaigning bodies, academic and specialists’ reports,
and the output of other research bodies” (Schäfer, Beer,
Zenker, and Fernandes 72). However, this information
does not necessarily have to be credible either. The
verification of information remains a “significant
challenge” for research organizations (Beloe, Scherer,
and Knoepfel 29; see also Laufer; Ramus and Montiel).
Additionally, Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel
(29) observe that companies are still “by far the
most important source of information” for research
organizations. SAM states that their company
questionnaire is “the most important source of
information for the assessment” leading to the
Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) (SAM
Indexes GmbH). EIRIS declares that their survey
serves to provide “the most recent and accurate
information available.” During the oekom rating
procedure “considerable importance” is attached to
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the cooperation with companies (oekom research,
oekom Corporate Rating). Despite the inclusion
of additional information and the fact that many
rating organizations today fill in large parts of the
questionnaires based on public data themselves
(Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel), these examples
demonstrate that companies are to some extent still
able to influence rating results.
Another important argument for the
increased inclusion of publicly available data is
‘questionnaire fatigue’ resulting from the intensive
surveying of companies (Beloe, Scherer, and
Knoepfel; Chatterji and Levine; econsense).
Companies have to spend considerable resources
to take part in surveys and to interact with research
organizations (Fowler and Hope, Chatterji and
Levine). Besides the increasing unwillingness to
participate in surveys, another possible negative sideeffect can be that inexperienced employees like interns
accomplish the rating survey process. This questions
the credibility of information even more (Hansen).
III.I.III BIAS
Another challenging aspect for CS ratings are biases.
Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and Fernandes state that
many CS ratings are biased, meaning that they put
special emphasis either on the environmental, social,
or economic dimension. However, overemphasizing
either one of the three dimensions is inconsistent
with the integrative character of CS. According to
that, companies are required to simultaneously take
account of and harmonize the environmental, social,
and economic dimension (Schaltegger and Burritt).
The particular economic bias is especially strong
in conventional ratings that use only selective CS
measures as add-on. However, the same bias exists
in well-established assessment approaches like the
DJSI, and thus, SAM’s rating (Fowler and Hope).
Fowler and Hope find that SAM does not consider
the three dimensions of sustainability in a balanced
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way. SAM’s assessment aims at identifying industryspecific best in class companies and focuses on
those that are “most likely to turn sustainability
into shareholder value” (Schäfer, Beer, Zenker,
and Fernandes 101). Accordingly, social and
environmental criteria weigh less than economic
ones (Fowler and Hope). This also applies to KLD
Research and Analytics, Inc. (now part of MSCI
Inc.) whose declared objective is to serve investors
(Chatterji and Toffel). Dillenburg, Greene, and
Erekson (169) describe the consideration of social
criteria in the assessment of large investment firms
as “just a collateral service.” This undifferentiated
approach is criticized by many authors who
highlight that ratings should be suitable for various
stakeholders with different interests (Beloe, Scherer,
and Knoepfel; Dillenburg, Greene, and Erekson;
Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid).
In contrast, special interest ratings may
put more emphasis on ethical (or normative) and/
or environmental issues while neglecting other
dimensions. One example is the sustainability
analysis of the Calvert Social Index, in which social
and ethical aspects are analyzed in more detail
than environmental aspects (Calvert Group, Ltd.;
Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and Fernandes).
Biases are also relevant for the type of
companies to be rated. A lot of ratings, rankings,
and indices aim at identifying sustainability leaders,
for instance the DJSI. However, most ratings focus
on larger companies and include neither small and
medium enterprises nor companies from emerging
countries (Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel; Fowler
and Hope; Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and Fernandes).
Consequently, sustainability leaders may not be
identified by this procedure, since the raters possibly
do not even include them in the sample (Fowler and
Hope) or they do not take part in the rating (selfselection bias) (Finch). Another difference in the
selection process is the usage of an existing index as
“underlying universe” versus actively screening for
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sustainability-oriented companies. For example, the
Dow Jones Indexes (DJI) serve as parent indices for
the DJSI (SAM Indexes GmbH) and several MSCI
indices for the MSCI ESG Indices (MSCI Inc.),
whereas the oekom universe also contains smaller
companies and “significant non-listed bond issuers”
(oekom research, oekom universe).
III.I.IV. TRADEOFFS
Closely connected to biases are tradeoffs. Most
ratings ultimately aim at producing one single
score that is a number or letter as result of the
rating process. For example, oekom’s rating uses
categories between A+ and D- (oekom research,
oekom Corporate Rating), and SAM’s rating works
with percentages (SAM and PwC). Expressing the
performance of companies in such a simple way
makes it easy to understand companies’ positions
and to compare them (Graafland, Eijffinger, and
Smid). Nonetheless, when creating a single score
of the individual measures across the triple bottom
line, raters assume that “values can be reduced to one
dimension” (Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid 151)
although they are “pluralistic in nature” (Graafland,
Eijffinger, and Smid 140). Aiming at one single
score means that shortcomings in one dimension
may be compensated by a better performance in
another (Delmas and Doctori-Blass). Hence, single
scores probably result in a distorted picture of the
actual sustainability performance of a company
because it is hardly taking into account all facets of
CS. Companies are required to embed sustainability
management in conventional management instead
of dealing with it in parallel. This implies that CS
has to be linked to the strategy, core business, and
day-to-day processes in all organizational units
(Stubbs and Cocklin). This integration challenge
complicates the assessment of CS, since activities,
outcomes, and budgets are the more difficult to
identify as sustainability-oriented the better they are

integrated. One single score is hardly able to reflect
these interdependencies properly.
Furthermore, CS is not a state to be reached
(de Ron; Epstein; Schaltegger and Burritt). Instead,
the concept occupies the demand for continuous
improvement which shows its process character.
Hence, an evaluation of CS should be carried out
in relative terms and requires the comparison to a
benchmark. One single score can only accomplish
this by relating to other scores, for example of other
companies or earlier ratings of the same company.
Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid even demand not
to conduct cross-sector benchmarking but to limit
comparisons to one industry. In fact, rating results
often consist of an additional comparative score. For
example, SAM translates sustainability scores into a
relative industry measure (SAM and PwC). Vigeo
and Forum Ethibel state in their rulebook on the
Ethibel Sustainability Indices that they intentionally
do not calculate a global company score or compile
a ranking based on the results of the individual
research fields. Still, especially rankings normally
oversimplify CS assessment.
III.I.V.

LACK OF TRANSPARENCY

When discussing the lack of transparency it has to
be pointed out positively that most of the criteria
accounted for in ratings are not determined by the
raters alone but together with third parties like
NGOs or academia. This first step in the direction
of “tripartism” (Laufer 259) serves to ensure that
ratings are more balanced and accepted and increases
transparency and accountability (Fowler and Hope).
Nonetheless, the research components leading
to rating results are rarely made fully available,
sometimes except for key clients (Beloe, Scherer,
and Knoepfel). This refers to the way information
is collected, the methodology, assumptions,
calculations, weightings, threshold values, and the
specific criteria of the analysis (Beloe, Scherer, and
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Knoepfel; Chatterji and Levine; Chatterji, Levine,
and Toffel; Delmas and Doctori-Blass; Dillenburg,
Greene, and Erekson; Fowler and Hope; Graafland,
Eijffinger, and Smid). Of course, this does not apply
for all ratings to the same extent, but, generally,
academics as well as companies criticize these
“black box” approaches (AI CSRR; Delmas and
Doctori-Blass; econsense). For example, the general
part of the questionnaire used for SAM’s Corporate
Sustainability Assessment rating is open to the
public, while the sector-specific questions are not
(SAM and PwC; Boms). Graafland, Eijffinger, and
Smid point to the importance of disclosing methods
and assumptions of benchmarks to stakeholders.
Dillenburg, Greene, and Erekson (169) criticize the
missing transparency of ratings as “troubling.” As
long as rating processes are not transparent, their
reliability may be questioned just like the reliability
of the companies to be examined. This is especially
important for solicited ratings where ratings’
customers, for example institutional investors,
choose their own criteria and weightings (Finch).
III.I.VI. LACK OF INDEPENDENCE
The relationship between companies and raters
established in order to get the necessary information
raises the question whether ratings are independent.
Research organizations increasingly depend on
the personal interaction with companies (Beloe,
Scherer, and Knoepfel). This is especially true when
the rating process is carried out repeatedly over
time, which is usually the case. For example, oekom
emphasizes the importance of the cooperation with
companies during their rating (oekom research,
oekom Corporate Rating) and SAM describes to
“proactively engage with companies” (SAM and
PwC 21).
The close relationship to companies might
call for even more criticism in cases where ratings
are conducted by financial service providers which
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already have or intend to establish further business
relations with the companies (e. g., consultancy,
financial analysis, or mandated risks assessments)
(AI CSRR; Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel). These
aspects might create conflicts of interest. They are
discussed in the European Corporate Sustainability
and Responsibility Research Quality Standard
(CSRR-QS), a quality standard for CS and SRI
research (see www.csrr-qs.org). Another potential
conflict brought up by Healy and Palepu is the
personal interest of financial analysts in screening
outcomes: “analysts are rewarded for providing
information that generates trading volume and
investment banking fees for their brokerage houses”
(Healy & Palepu 417). This may encourage upward
biases of rating results.
One more relevant aspect in this context
is the distinction between solicited and unsolicited
ratings. Solicited ratings are carried out for a
particular client and paid for (Finch). This fact also
puts into question the independence of the ratings.
So far the paper has identified six important
challenges that come along with CS ratings. Of
course, more challenges can be found in the literature,
for example in the “Rate the Raters” publications
(Sadowski, Whitaker, and Buckingham, Rate the
Raters Phase One) or from a philosophical point of
view (Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid). Still, the six
challenges described here together form the most
prominently discussed aspects. In the following, the
paper analyzes the causes of these challenges and
suggests ways to tackle them.
III.II.

WHAT ARE THE CAUSES
OF THE IDENTIFIED
CHALLENGES?

The six challenges that CS ratings face have been
identified as lack of standardization, lack of credibility
of information, bias, tradeoffs, lack of transparency,
and lack of independence. In the following, the paper
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discusses the causes of these challenges based on
general literature on CS and CS assessment.
III.II.I. LACK OF RATING
STANDARDIZATION AND THE
COMPLEXITY OF CS
The lack of rating standardization is not only the
outcome of the competitive market for ratings but
also the result of the complexity of CS. Even if
there were a commonly accepted definition of the
concept, it would still be highly complex. However,
research and practice have widely agreed upon the
triple bottom line approach requiring the mutual
consideration of environmental, social, and economic
aspects (Elkington). According to this approach, CS
comprises a contribution to sustainable development
of companies on the one hand and to the environment,
society, and economy on the other (Loew, Ankele,
Braun, and Clausen; Schaltegger and Burritt). CS
therefore has to be assessed not only with regard to
its various constituent parts, but also to long-term
or rebound effects and further interdependencies
(Stahlmann and Clausen; Wiedmann, Lenzen, and
Barrett). Furthermore, the results of CS cannot be
traced by “focusing on what goes on within the
factory fences, farm gates, or company premises”
(Wiedmann, Lenzen, and Barrett 362). CS typically
crosses companies’ boundaries, which implies that
their sustainability performance is not only to be
assessed in terms of internal measures but also of
“impact” (Epstein; Wiedmann, Lenzen, and Barrett).
Assessment on the impact level is dealt with more
closely for example in development agencies, and
despite those agencies’ long experience it remains a
complex issue (Roche).
The consequence is that companies’
sustainability performance is very difficult to assess
(Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid). That is why a
large variety of internal and external approaches
exist that deal differently with the assessment of CS.

Of course, this applies for ratings and their varying
methodologies, too, and makes standardization efforts
like the CSRR-QS (AI CSSR) or SustainAbility’s
“Rate the Raters” research program (Sadowski,
Whitaker, Lee, and Ayars) necessary. Accordingly,
missing standardization does not only affect ratings
but all CS assessment approaches since it results from
the concept of CS itself.
III.II.II. LACK OF CREDIBILITY OF
RATING INFORMATION
AND THE LACK OF DATA
AVAILABILITY
The question of credibility of the information that
ratings use and offer is directly related to the lack of
CS data availability. This problem affects internal as
well as external CS assessment. Whereas internally
the major problems are mostly matters of knowledge,
information systems, and other management tools
(Schaltegger), externally the question is rather one of
limited data access. Most of the information required
by ratings, if collected at all, is sensitive and rarely
made publicly available (Lyon and Maxwell). Thus,
not only rating organizations but all providers of CS
assessments depend on self-disclosure of companies
in addition to publicly available data. Therefore,
suitable internal assessment is indispensable for the
accomplishment of external assessment (Chatterji
and Levine). Furthermore, due to the complexity
of CS the question remains which data to measure.
Accordingly, the lack of credibility of information
results from the lack of CS data and therefore affects
every CS assessment.
III.II.III. RATING BIAS AND THE
FINANCIAL BACKGROUND OF
RATINGS’ USERS
Another aspect is the bias of ratings. As already
described, the emphasis on economic issues is a
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result of the increasing interest of conventional
analysts in sustainability. These actors probably
have only little interest in the mutual consideration
and integration of the economic, environmental, and
social dimension because of their finance-oriented
background. Investor-focused ratings rather regard
environmental and social issues as add-on.
Other CS assessment approaches may face
different biases. For example, organic food labels
and consumer-focused ratings may mainly consider
environmental aspects. Thus, biases opposing
the integrative assessment of CS are a challenge
that other assessment approaches have to face
alike. Still, the bias to the financial dimension is
a problem that affects ratings in particular because
of their use within the financial market and their
stakeholders’ demands.
III.II.IV.

RATING TRADEOFFS AND
THE DEMAND OF RATINGS’
USERS

Tradeoffs also result from the demands of ratings’
users. Most ratings are designed to primarily fulfill
the needs of their main users, investors, who focus
on traditional financial analysis (Beloe, Scherer, and
Knoepfel; Delmas and Doctori-Blass; Dillenburg,
Greene, and Erekson; econsense). Presenting the
rating results in form of single scores makes them
easy to compare and communicate, and thus,
suitable for investment decisions.
Additionally, many ratings also serve for
rankings and indices which makes it inevitable to
have a single, comparable figure. Beyond that, the
communication of the results of CS assessments in a
comprehensive, and at the same time, complete manner
is challenging for other approaches, too.
III.II.V. LACK OF RATING
TRANSPARENCY AND THEIR
COMMERCIAL USE
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A widely discussed challenge for ratings is their
lack of transparency. When rating organizations do
not disclose their methodology, weightings, etc.,
stakeholders cannot tell what it is that they measure.
As long as ratings lack transparency, their credibility
and reliability may be questioned just like the
reliability of the companies to be examined.
This particular challenge results primarily
from the young, dynamic, and competitive rating
market and the aim to maintain commercial
advantage (Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel;
econsense). Since it can be expected that only a few
“winners” will remain in the market (Sadowski,
Whitaker, Lee, and Ayars 5), raters try to generate
and maintain unique selling propositions, and
undisclosed methodologies are hard to imitate.
However, it has to be pointed out that some rating
organizations are already more transparent than
others. For example, Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel
refer to Ethibel, SAM Research, and Vigeo as best
practice organizations, and Sadowski, Whitaker,
and Buckingham (Rate the Raters. Phase One)
point to Corporate Knights Inc. Furthermore,
transparency does not only affect ratings, but is also
discussed with regard to other “quality assurances
and the substantiation of socially relevant claims”
(de Boer 261), for instance certification processes
for labels and audits (de Boer; Jahn, Schramm, and
Spiller; Müller)
.
III.II.VI. LACK OF RATING
INDEPENDENCE AND THE
INTERMINGLED BUSINESS
OF RATERS
The last aspect is the missing independence of
ratings. Contact between raters and companies
may be unavoidable, but in order to guarantee an
objective assessment the relation should not be
closer than necessary. In order to reliably assess
CS, rating organizations should especially not have
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further bonds with companies because that may
in the worst case offer an incentive to manipulate
rating results. Graafland, Eijffinger, and Smid (139)
argue that researchers should carry out the analysis
in a “disinterested way.” This problem is a matter
of governance. As rating organizations often do not
only carry out ratings but have intermingled relations
to the assessed companies, their independence and
objectivity have to be questioned.
This aspect is reflected in a recent
survey conducted among sustainability experts
by Globescan. The survey shows that among
different raters, NGOs are most trusted, followed
by companies’ employees. Rating and ranking
organizations come only in the third place,
mainstream investors even later. When asked about
the trust in particular ratings and rankings, the
highest ranked approach, the DJSI, was classified as
“highly trusted” by not more than 48 per cent of the
respondents (Sadowski, Whitaker, and Buckingham,
Rate the Raters. Phase Two).
This lack of belief in the credibility of
ratings is incompatible with their purpose to increase
transparency and reliably reduce information
asymmetries. The situation is comparable to that
of certifiers and auditors (Epstein; Finch). Epstein
(246) states that “some observers have wondered
whether, as with financial auditors, verifiers should
act as both consultants and auditors […].” Finch
(17) finds that “the provision by auditors of nonaudit advisory services to companies undermines
the independence of the audit.” In the context of the
food market, Jahn, Schramm, and Spiller describe
the necessity of reducing auditors’ dependency on
the companies to be certified with regard to quality
labels. The challenge of independence particularly
affects organizations or businesses that have further
relations to companies.
The six challenges identified and described
may have different causes, but combined they
diminish the reliability of ratings. Against the

background of their causes, the upcoming section
discusses possible improvements for each challenge.
IV.

WAYS TO IMPROVE CS
ASSESSMENT THROUGH
RATINGS

In summary, and as Table 3 shows, the identified
challenges have different causes and thus have
to be tackled differently. Some of the challenges
can be ascribed to the concept of cs itself and
constitute general challenges when assessing CS
(lack of standardization and lack of credibility of
information). Furthermore, some challenges for CS
ratings result from the financial background and
demands of the ratings’ users (bias and tradeoffs),
whereas other challenges result from the commercial
use of ratings and the intermingled business
relations of raters (lack of transparency and lack of
independence). In the following, recommendations
are given to improve the reliability of ratings.
IV.I.

GENERAL CHALLENGES
WHEN ASSESSING CS

The lack of standardization and the lack of
credibility of information of ratings are results of
the complexity of CS and the lack of availability of
CS data. Meeting these general challenges requires
the contribution of various disciplines and actors in
research and practice. On the one hand, the concept
of CS itself still is hard to grasp. It can be expected
and is desirable for the various actors involved to
come to an agreement on a basic common definition
in the near future. Furthermore, a more precise
understanding of CS could be generated within the
realm of ratings in particular, ideally in collaboration
with third parties to include various perspectives
on CS. A common understanding could enable
coordinated research like the one of the Sustainable
Investment Research International Group (SIRI)
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(Chatterji and Levine; Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and
Fernandes). This is one way to reduce the large
number of ratings, which could positively influence
data availability and the credibility of data since
fewer inquiries of greater quality would be directed
at companies. NGOs and other third parties could
furthermore be included in the data generation for
external verification. So far, each rating uses their
individual measures, which is at least inefficient
(Sadowski, Whitaker, Lee, and Ayars).
IV.II.

THE FINANCIAL BACKGROUND
AND DEMANDS OF RATINGS’
USERS

Furthermore, some CS rating challenges result from
the interest and demands of ratings’ users: bias and
tradeoffs. The particular bias towards financial
issues and the demand for single, comparable
scores in part even oppose the idea of CS. These
challenges derive from the expectations of investors,
financial analysts, and other ratings’ users with
financial background. Instead of using CS as addon to conventional ratings, financial markets have
to learn and acknowledge its integrative character
which entails more balanced assessments than
what is common practice. This could be achieved
by opening ratings for a wider audience (Sadowski,
Whitaker, Lee, and Ayars) and the cooperation
with stakeholders, especially NGOs and (potential)
customers, which represent the environmental and
social dimension of sustainability and thus bring in
new perspectives (Laufer).
In the context of the financial market,
identifying further Business Cases for Sustainability
(Schaltegger and Wagner) might also help to accomplish
a shift in the perception of CS from “knock-out criterion”
to a more (economically) relevant aspect. Furthermore,
it is desirable to enable stakeholders with differing
interests to make use of ratings (Sadowski, Whitaker,
Lee, and Ayars). Rating results should be offered to
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stakeholders in a way that enables them to carry out
their own evaluation according to their perceptions of
and interests in CS. This could be a way to enhance
the acceptance of ratings and to promote sustainable
development. So far, most ratings, especially those used
in the financial market, are not designed to handle this
evaluative character of CS.
The same holds true regarding tradeoffs:
the publication of detailed information on the
calculation of a final score could serve to increase
the interest of further stakeholders and to promote
the use of ratings. Furthermore, biases in the units
of analysis of ratings could be reduced by their
extension to small and medium-sized enterprises.
IV.III. THE COMMERCIAL USE
OF RATINGS AND THE
INTERMINGLED BUSINESS
RELATIONS OF RATERS
The lack of independence and the lack of transparency
of ratings result from the characteristics of the
rating organizations and the commercial use of CS
assessment. As the Globecan results show, NGOs
are trusted more than rating organizations, possibly
because NGOs are less directly trying to make
commercial use of CS assessments and because they
rarely have further business relations with companies.
A possible improvement for the reliability of ratings
thus could be the prominent cooperation with one or
more NGOs in the rating process (Laufer). However,
independence and transparency are also relevant
for other CS assessment approaches like audits,
certificates, and labels. Similar recommendations
apply here, for example consultants should not be
auditors at the same time (Epstein).
In order to increase their transparency,
rating organizations could furthermore (alone or
together with an NGO) disclose their methods,
measures, and the content of their surveys. This
applies to other assessment approaches like audits
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Rating challenge

Cause

Possible improvements

Lack of standardization

Complexity of CS

Find a common CS understanding including
several perspectives, coordinate research

Lack of credibility of
information

Lack of data availability

Include NGOs and third parties for external
verification

Bias

Financial background of
ratings’ users

Sensitize ratings’ users for the integrative
character of CS, open ratings for a wider
audience

Tradeoffs

Demand of ratings’ users

See above

Lack of transparency

Commercial use of ratings Disclose methodology

Lack of independence

Intermingled business of
raters

Avoid business relations to companies, include
independent third parties

Table 3: Rating challenges, causes, and possible improvements
and labels, too. A further possibility to increase the
reliability of ratings is to make use of independent
assurance to verify commitments, ideally with
an NGO due to their higher credibility (Laufer;
Ramus and Montiel). Additionally, in order to
provide reliable information and to enhance their
credibility, rating organizations could, at least,
disclose potential conflicts and how they are
handled. At best, of course, those conflicts should
be avoided and analysts completely independent.
This applies for other intermediaries carrying out
audits or assessments, too, be it on the general
capital market (Healy and Palepu) or regarding CS
in particular. Besides self-imposed principles, the
establishment of standards, such as the CSRR-QS
(AI CSRR), might help to increase trust in those
research organizations. Further research in this area
should be a sound combination of practice demands
and theoretical contributions.
Table 3 offers a summary of the aspects
discussed in this part.
V.

CONCLUSION

Fostering sustainable development and CS in

particular depends on suitable CS assessment
approaches. The paper has shown that ratings, on
the one hand, are a practice-relevant approach to
assess CS externally. On the other hand, several
characteristics of ratings are criticized in research
and practice. This paper served to assemble and
systematize the main rating challenges described
in the literature: lack of standardization, lack of
credibility of information, bias, tradeoffs, lack of
transparency, and lack of independence.
An analysis of these challenges reveals that
they have different causes. Some general challenges
when assessing CS result from the concept of CS
itself (lack of standardization and lack of credibility
of information). Other challenges result from the
demand side of ratings and show the financial
background and demands of the ratings’ users (bias
and tradeoffs). Last but not least, some challenges
result from the supply side of ratings, namely the
commercial use of ratings and the intermingled
business relations of raters (lack of transparency
and lack of independence). They also affect other
CS assessment approaches like audits and labels.
Improving the reliability of CS ratings is relevant,
since they fulfill an important function with regard to
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overcoming the information asymmetry in the context
of CS. Beyond that, ratings are able to positively
influence companies’ sustainability efforts, foster
the institutionalization of information management,
and stimulate competition between companies
(Chatterji and Levine; Dillenburg, Greene, and
Erekson; Fowler and Hope; Graafland, Eijffinger,
and Smid). And despite the somewhat negative
effects that it may have on the understanding of CS,
“[t]he financial industry is in a unique position to
move corporations towards corporate sustainability”
(Delmas and Doctori-Blass 245). What is needed
now is a “second generation” of ratings and related
research (Beloe, Scherer, and Knoepfel 3) including
NGOs and thereby other perspectives (Laufer).
Especially those challenges resulting from the
supplier side of ratings (see 4.3) should be tackled
proactively in order to increase the reliability and
acceptance of ratings as CS assessment approach.
Overcoming CS assessment hurdles can be achieved
by several first improvements suggested in this
paper. But, due to the interdisciplinary character of
CS, these problems cannot be entirely solved by one
actor, like raters, but require further research and
contributions from several disciplines in research
and practice. CS assessment is a process in its own
right – just like CS itself.
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